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ABSTRACT. An increase in the frequency and intensity of environmental crises associated with
accelerating human-induced global change is of substantial concern to policy makers. The potential impacts,
especially on the poor, are exacerbated in an increasingly connected world that enables the emergence of
crises that are coupled in time and space. We discuss two factors that can interact to contribute to such an
increased concatenation of crises: (1) the increasing strength of global vs. local drivers of change, so that
changes become increasingly synchronized; and (2) unprecedented potential for the propagation of crises,
and an enhanced risk of management interventions in one region becoming drivers elsewhere, because of
increased connectivity. We discuss the oil-food-financial crisis of 2007 to 2008 as an example of a
concatenated crisis with origin and ultimate impacts in far removed parts of the globe. The potential for a
future of concatenated shocks requires adaptations in science and governance including (a) an increased
tolerance of uncertainty and surprise, (b) strengthening capacity for early detection and response to shocks,
and (c) flexibility in response to enable adaptation and learning.
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INTRODUCTION
The risk of an escalation in number and intensity of
crises arising from accelerating human-induced
global change is an issue of substantial concern to
policy makers (MA 2005, IPCC 2007, Battisti and
Naylor 2009, Rockström et al. 2009). In particular,
there is evidence to suggest that large magnitude
disturbances may become increasingly coupled in
time and space, leading to concatenated global
crises (MA 2005, Adger et al. 2009, Rockström et
al 2009). An escalation in global shocks, and
particularly concatenated global shocks, are likely
to have especially large impacts on the world’s poor
and jeopardize efforts to substantively reduce global
poverty in the 21st century (WRI 2008, UNDP 2010,
World Bank 2010).
Disasters such as recent flooding in Pakistan and
China, unprecedented fires in Russia, and hurricane
Katrina, which had damage costs of over US$250
Billion (Comfort 2005), are recent examples of
‘natural disasters’ that particularly affected the
poor. There is now substantial evidence that the
frequency of such events is likely to increase
because of human-induced global change, including
climate change, land-cover conversion, and
increased global connectivity (MA 2005, IPCC
2007). If such events also become more
concatenated, their impacts are likely to be
worsened. For instance, the impacts of recent
flooding in northeastern Australia increased
vulnerability of affected areas to the impacts of
cyclone Yasi.
Growing global connectivity increases the potential
for crises to spread, synchronize, and interact in
novel ways as social-ecological systems (SESs)
around the world become increasingly connected
(Young et al. 2006, Peters et al. 2008). The global
number of internet users grew by 362% from 360
million in 2000 to 1.67 billion in 2009 (International
Telecommunications Union 2009), and has been an
important factor in the spread of political dissent,
for example in North Africa. International tourism
arrivals grew from 25 million in 1950 to just under
700 million in 2002, and over 900 million in 2007
(World Tourism Organization 2008), but then
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dropped worldwide during the 2008 financial crisis.
In biotic systems, the spread of alien invasive
species is accelerating (McGeogh et al. 2010),
particularly in association with increased movement
of goods and people around the globe.
This paper provides a synthetic summary of the
mechanisms through which large magnitude
disturbances are increasingly coupled in time and
space, leading to concatenated crises. Concatenated
crises are disturbances, i.e., shocks, that emerge near
simultaneously, spread rapidly, and interact with
each other across the globe. We analyze the food
price crisis of 2008, an interaction between the oil
price spike of 2007, pro-biofuel policies, and
reactionary protectionism, as an example of a
globally coupled crisis in which origin and effects
stemmed from far removed parts of the world and
diverse economic sectors, and particularly affected
the poor. Finally, we discuss recent advances in
resilience thinking, specifically how advances in
detecting regime shifts and in governance thinking
can build resilience to concatenated crises.
MECHANISMS FOR CONCATENATED
CRISES
Two mechanisms may lead to enhanced
concatenation of crises. First, global drivers are
becoming increasingly dominant over local drivers
as determinants of the dynamics of SESs. This
increases pressures experienced by a SES; many
failures are attributed to ‘multiple stresses,’ acting
additively or even multiplicatively. Importantly, it
also leads to synchronous changes across systems
in different parts of the globe, increasing the scale
of disasters. Second, increased connectivity can
enable local disturbances to propagate faster,
turning local disasters into global crises. Increased
connectivity also means there is a higher risk of
management responses in one system unintendedly
precipitating undesirable change in far removed
systems.
Powerful global-scale drivers
Global-scale processes are increasingly important
drivers of change. Examples include climate change
(IPCC 2007), ocean acidification (Orr et al. 2005),
invasive species (McGeogh et al. 2010), pandemics
such as the extinction of amphibians due to the
Chytrid fungus (Berger et al. 1998), and the
globalization of agricultural commodity markets
(Adger et al 2009). Global drivers on their own, or
in combination with local drivers, can put sufficient
pressure on local ecosystems to result in collapse of
the delivery of local ecosystem services on which
the poor often directly depend. For example,
increasing temperatures and lower rainfall thought
to be associated with global-scale greenhouse gas
emissions add extra pressure to ecosystems in
southeastern Australia (Murphy and Timbal 2008)
that have already suffered extensive degradation
due to local pressures. These combined global and
local-scale pressures have jeopardized commercial
crop production and water quality in several areas
and led to bankruptcy of farmers (Pengelly and
Fishburn 2002).
Propagation of shocks and management
responses through increasing global
connectivity
Increased connectivity enables local-scale processes
to propagate upward, generating impacts at
continental to global scales (Peters et al. 2008).
Disease epidemics are especially sensitive to
connectivity. The spread of bubonic plague (‘Black
Death’) in the 14th century was by local spatial
diffusion, which effectively confined it to Europe.
In contrast, growing connectivity in the age of air
travel means that disease epidemics that previously
might have died-out locally are now propagated
around the globe, as in the case of the SARS and
H1N1 outbreaks (Fraser et al. 2009, Vespignani
2009). Thus, if global pandemics are to be contained
in the modern era, a highly effective system of early
disease detection and rapid response is required.
Socioeconomic systems are also susceptible to rapid
contagion. The potential for the propagation of
crises to distant SESs can, on their own, or in
combination with global and local pressures push
those systems below a critical level of service
delivery. For example, the global financial crisis of
2008 propagated from failures in the U.S. housing
market to the banking sector in the developed world,
ultimately affecting availability of credit globally
and impacting the poor in both developed and
developing regions. In particular, although this
crisis primarily affected banking sectors in high
income countries, it substantially exacerbated levels
of unemployment and poverty in low and middle
income countries (Brunnermeier 2009, McCawley
2009, World Bank 2009).
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Greater connectivity and enhanced feedbacks
between systems furthermore increases risk that
management responses in one region become
drivers of change in others. As impacts of global
drivers and propagated disturbances increase,
decision makers take action to mitigate the impacts
of these crises in their constituencies. In a highly
coupled world, actions in one region may add
pressures to systems in other regions and create, or
contribute to, crisis conditions elsewhere. For
example, Adger et al. (2009) show how incentives
for increased coffee production in Vietnam had the
intended effect of increased well-being for some in
Vietnam, but led to a reduction in global coffee
prices, decreasing livelihood security of communities
dependent on coffee production in Mexico.
THE FOOD PRICE CRISIS:
CONCATENATION AT WORK
The food price crisis of 2007 to 2008 is an excellent
example of how policy responses by individual
countries, combined with powerful global drivers
in highly coupled systems, ultimately affected the
entire globe. Between 2004 and 2008, the price of
staples such as rice increased by 255% and wheat
by 81% before falling again (Fig. 1; Headey and Fan
2008). The increased food prices resulted in
effective food shortages, as poorer people were no
longer able to afford food, and to food riots in a
number of countries (Fig. 2), ultimately affecting
over 100 million people worldwide. Prior to 2004,
the real prices of staple foods had declined for nearly
three decades and were at an all-time low (Headey
and Fan 2008). However, from 2004 to 2008, the
price of petroleum, coal, and natural gas increased
by an average of 127% (Headey and Fan 2008).
Energy forms a large component of food production
and transport costs. In 2003, the EU enacted pro-
biofuel production policies (the USA followed in
2005), partly in response to the rising energy price,
but also in response to security concerns and to some
extent to mitigate climate change. From 2007 to
2008, the resulting conversion of land from food to
biofuel production exacerbated inflationary
pressure on global food prices, already higher from
increasing energy and fertilizer costs. Some authors
also point to the effect of droughts in key production
regions in reducing food supplies as an additional
cause of the price escalation (Garber 2008, Mitchell
2008). In dealing with the emerging food price
crisis, a number of countries, starting with India but
ultimately including Egypt, Vietnam, Argentina,
Russia, India, and China, enacted food export
restrictions, bans, and taxes, which further restricted
food supply and exacerbated price increases at the
global scale (Beattie 2008). For rice in particular,
the export bans played a major role in the upsurge
in price (Headey and Fan 2008). Moreover, globally
connected financial markets have allowed the
development of commodity derivatives including
food. Investments in commodity derivatives are
used as a hedge because returns in the commodity
sector are relatively uncorrelated with returns to
other assets (FAO 2010). Although commodity
derivatives were not the cause of the food price
crisis, the derivative markets have probably
amplified price volatility (Headey and Fan 2008,
FAO 2010).
The food price crisis illustrates how a series of
concatenated global crises interacted with different
policy responses in a diverse range of countries to
propagate the crisis throughout a highly connected
global system. Rising energy prices were the global
driver that underpinned the crisis. The national-
scale pro-biofuel policies, a policy response from
powerful high income countries, contributed to the
increase of food prices globally. Food export
restrictions were a response by decision makers in
middle and low income countries to try to avert
crises within their constituencies. However, the
highly coupled nature of global food markets
resulted in drastic price increases because of the
export restrictions. The result was food shortages
and riots in many low income countries in the
Caribbean, Africa, and Asia (Fig. 2).
The food price crisis also illustrates how vulnerable
low income communities are often most seriously
affected by global crises. The population groups
most vulnerable to higher food prices are those that
spend a large proportion of their income on food,
and have few coping strategies on which to rely
(Brinkman et al. 2009, Yngve et al. 2009). The
2007-2008 food price crisis was followed shortly
by the global financial crisis that reduced exports,
economic growth, levels of employment, and
government budgets for social support in many low
and middle income countries (Brinkman et al.
2009). Although food prices dropped as a result of
financial crisis, the Food and Agriculture
Organization’s Cereal Price Index was still 50%
higher in January 2009 than in 2005. Simulations
suggest that an additional 457 million people are
therefore at risk of hunger and malnutrition
(Brinkman et al. 2009).
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Fig. 1. International prices of rice and wheat from 1983 to 2008 per ton in US$ and timeline of key
events in the food price crisis (Headey and Fan 2008, IRRI 2010). 
COMPOUNDING EFFECTS AND NOVEL
CRISES
Agricultural production provides a good example
of how humans aim to suppress natural variation,
for example in water availability and pest outbreaks,
to create a stable environment for economic activity.
The tendency to reduce natural variation in a highly
connected world creates further possibilities for the
emergence of entirely novel crises.
The compounding effect of suppressing natural
variation
Humanity’s tendency to damp down natural
variation can reduce the buffering capacity of SESs
to shocks. The policy of suppressing small wildfires,
for instance in the western USA and southeast
Australia, has led to large, high-impact
conflagrations because of the build-up of fuel
(Minnich 2001, Janssen et al. 2004). Repeated
insecticide application has been associated with
periodic outbreak of insect plagues (Ludwig et al.
1978). This is because ecosystem components and
suites of species that are adapted to extreme values
of environmental conditions are competitively
disadvantaged when those conditions are not
experienced, and are progressively lost from the
system. Hence, in the first example, plant
communities become dominated by nonfire adapted
species, which are overwhelmed by the intensity of
the eventual fire. In the second example, when
insecticides fail, the natural mechanisms that limit
insect outbreaks are no longer effective. In an
analogous case, the canalization and structural
modification of river systems have increased the
amplitude and frequency of severe floods as the
natural buffering capacity against floods is reduced
or removed (Criss and Shock 2001). Paradoxically,
we tame the environment to promote stability but
this taming may sow the seeds for later larger crises.
The reduced buffering capacity of SESs to shocks
increases the risk of transgressing dangerous
thresholds; increased connectivity then propagates
the failure elsewhere.
The emergence of novel crises
The food price crisis was a global emergency that
stemmed from powerful global drivers, high levels
of connectivity, and reactive national policies. We
may be able to predict, and mitigate against, the re-
Ecology and Society 16(2): 27
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss2/art27/
Fig. 2. The interactive effects of global drivers and national-scale policy responses led to the food price
crisis of 2007 to 2008 with origins and impacts in far removed regions and sectors of the globe. The
crisis was exacerbated by droughts in key production regions. 
emergence of similar crises. However, complex
systems of interdependent networks can also behave
in unexpected ways leading to outcomes that are
difficult, or close to impossible, to predict
(Vespignani 2009, Buldyrev et al. 2010). In
addition, it is very challenging to detect the approach
of a critical threshold in a SES without actually
crossing it (Biggs et al. 2009, Scheffer et al. 2009).
Timely and accurate prediction of large-scale
system collapses resulting from concatenated
crises, in which the transgression of critical
thresholds, interconnectivity, and reduced buffering
capacity to shocks interact, may be beyond our
capacity, and once they emerge, our response
strategies may be inadequate for such unprecedented
situations.
ADVANCING UNDERSTANDING OF
CONCATENATED CRISES
How can humanity deal with the uncertainty
implicit in an era of novel concatenated crises? We
propose the following research areas to further our
understanding:
 
l
 Which local systems are particularly
vulnerable to the pressures imposed by global
drivers?
 
l
 Which thresholds may exist at regional to
global-scale (planetary boundaries, sensu
Rockström et al. 2009) that may lead to
propagating crises?
 
l
 Under what circumstances are the effects of
crossing local-scale thresholds likely to
propagate upward and outward, because of
connectivity and interdependence?
 
l
 What types of management response at local
and regional scales are likely to have
undesirable consequences for other regions?
 
l
 What types of actions can contain the spread
of shocks once they occur (sensu Vespignani
2009), and at what scales are they effective?
 The answers to these questions are currently
unclear, except in unhelpfully general terms. Some
of the uncertainty may be reducible through
research and by applying advances in network
theory and analysis (e.g., Buldyrev et al. 2010) and
web-based tools for monitoring (e.g., Galaz et al.
2010). However, other aspects of the uncertainty
surrounding concatenated crises are probably
irreducible, because they result from fundamentally
unpredictable processes. As society increasingly
confronts such situations, there is a need to evolve
responses suited to the realities of complex systems.
Humanity needs to learn to live within dynamic,
diverse, and interconnected systems. Society’s
ability to deal with crises will be enhanced by our
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capacity to learn from experiences elsewhere and in
the past (Pahl-Wostl 2006, Chapin et al. 2010). For
example, awareness of the consequences of
government inaction during the Great Depression
of 1929 to 1933 enabled a concerted policy response
by governments during the recent financial crisis
(Wolf 2009). The EU’s reduction in incentives for
biofuels in response to the 2007-2008 food price
crisis is another example of adaptive learning.
Similarly, an increased tolerance of noncrisis level
variation in SESs can reduce the risk of collapse
when a system is exposed to larger shocks.
Moreover, successfully coping with small
disturbances has been shown to increase the
resilience of individuals, organizations, and
communities to later crises (van Praag 2003,
Cioccio and Michael 2007).
Recent developments in understanding how
systems behave when they are close to transitions
may offer new tools in dealing with the increased
potential of unexpected changes. There is evidence
of a variety of statistical signals prior to critical
transitions (Scheffer et al. 2009). Systems close to
a threshold appear increasingly volatile (Carpenter
and Brock 2006) and correlated (Ives 1995), both
in time (Held and Kleinen 2004) and in space (Dakos
et al. 2010). Although these signals do not provide
the precise location of a threshold, they do give an
indication of the proximity to a regime shift (van
Nes and Scheffer 2007).
The same increased connectivity that promotes the
concatenation of crises also provides unprecedented
opportunities to learn about emerging problems and
coordinate a response. For example, the World
Health Organization uses web-crawlers to collect
data that can help detect the outbreak of an epidemic
(Weir and Mykhalovskiy 2006). Similar approaches
can be combined with the early warning methods
mentioned above, to provide tools that may prevent
the spread of concatenated crises in ecosystems and
SESs (Galaz et al. 2010).
GOVERNANCE OF CONCATENATED
CRISES
There is increasing evidence that a polycentric
approach to governance builds adaptive capacity
and creates more robust institutional arrangements
to unexpected disturbances (Anderies et al. 2007,
Ostrom 2010). In a polycentric approach, multiple
governing bodies at a variety of scales have
jurisdiction over specific issues and geographic
regions (Ostrom et al. 1961). The combination of
autonomy and the interaction with other governing
bodies provides opportunities for experimentation
and learning across multiple issues, arenas, and
scales. Multiple independent governance arrangements
provide both a diversity of approaches to a crisis
and the redundancy to recover in cases of failure
(Folke et al. 2005). Such flexibility and
opportunities for learning contrast with top-down
bureaucratic structures, designed to minimize
change. Building networks of organizations
committed to a process of continual inquiry,
informed action, and adaptive learning is a more
flexible and more robust strategy to cope with
disasters than the standard practice of establishing
greater control over possible threats through inward
focused administrative structures (Comfort 2005).
However, polycentric systems of governance, while
improving the capacity for experimentation and
learning, still require two further shifts from
traditional governance models for effective
response to increasingly complex crises. The first
shift requires individual jurisdictions to take
advantage of the findings from across a polycentric
system and allow for adaptive policy making.
Decision makers, whether bureaucrats or
businesspeople, politicians or the public, too often
retain a perspective that views experimentation and
revision based on new information as an
acknowledgement of error and poor judgment,
rather than as the only means of working through
complex, nearly intractable problems. The second
shift requires a diagnostic approach to governance
(Ostrom 2007). Similar to diagnostics in medicine,
this approach systematically looks at a framework
comprised of large numbers of relevant variables
that affect patterns of interaction and outcome for a
situation without necessarily analyzing every causal
relationship. Instead, in response to living in an ever
changing complex system that is only incompletely
understood, the focus is on ongoing analysis,
experimentation, and adaptation rather than on
finding ideal solutions and one-stop fixes.
In conclusion, we argue that the interaction of strong
global drivers, increased potential for the
propagation of disturbances across systems, and the
heightened likelihood of policy responses in one
region affecting other regions can lead to a
concatenation of crises. Scientific capacity for the
early detection of dangerous and potentially
propagating crises needs to be advanced, as does
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understanding and awareness of feedbacks and
interdependencies that can lead to impacts
spreading to other systems. Globally coherent
strategies for the management of large crises,
supported by a mind-set that uses crises as an
opportunity for learning, are required.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss2/art27/
responses/
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